We prove that for every ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{2}^{0}$ enumeration degree b there exists a noncuppable ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{2}^{0}$ degree a > 0 e such that b′ ≤ e a′ and a″ ≤ e b″. This allows us to deduce, from results on the high/low jump hierarchy in the local Turing degrees and the jump preserving properties of the standard embedding l: D T → D e , that there exist ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{2}^{0}$ noncuppable enumeration degrees at every possible—i.e., above low₁—level of the high/low (...) jump hierarchy in the context of D e. (shrink)

We investigate and extend the notion of a good approximation with respect to the enumeration ${({\mathcal D}_{\rm e})}$ and singleton ${({\mathcal D}_{\rm s})}$ degrees. We refine two results by Griffith, on the inversion of the jump of sets with a good approximation, and we consider the relation between the double jump and index sets, in the context of enumeration reducibility. We study partial order embeddings ${\iota_s}$ and ${\hat{\iota}_s}$ of, respectively, ${{\mathcal D}_{\rm e}}$ and ${{\mathcal D}_{\rm T}}$ (the Turing degrees) into (...) ${{\mathcal D}_{\rm s}}$ , and we show that the image of ${{\mathcal D}_{\rm T}}$ under ${\hat{\iota}_s}$ is precisely the class of retraceable singleton degrees. We define the notion of a good enumeration, or singleton, degree to be the property of containing the set of good stages of some good approximation, and we show that ${\iota_s}$ preserves the latter, as also other naturally arising properties such as that of totality or of being ${\Gamma^0_n}$ , for ${\Gamma \in \{\Sigma,\Pi,\Delta\}}$ and n > 0. We prove that the good enumeration and singleton degrees are immune and that the good ${\Sigma^0_2}$ singleton degrees are hyperimmune. Finally we show that, for singleton degrees a s < b s such that b s is good, any countable partial order can be embedded in the interval (a s, b s). (shrink)

A set A is symmetric enumeration (se-) reducible to a set B (A ≤\sb se B) if A is enumeration reducible to B and \barA is enumeration reducible to \barB. This reducibility gives rise to a degree structure (D\sb se) whose least element is the class of computable sets. We give a classification of ≤\sb se in terms of other standard reducibilities and we show that the natural embedding of the Turing degrees (D\sb T) into the enumeration degrees (D\sb e) (...) translates to an embedding (ι\sb se) into D\sb se that preserves least element, suprema, and infima. We define a weak and a strong jump and we observe that ι\sb se preserves the jump operator relative to the latter definition. We prove various (global) results concerning branching, exact pairs, minimal covers, and diamond embeddings in D\sb se. We show that certain classes of se-degrees are first-order definable, in particular, the classes of semirecursive, Σ\sb n ⋃ Π\sb n, Δ\sb n (for any n \in ω), and embedded Turing degrees. This last result allows us to conclude that the theory of D\sb se has the same 1-degree as the theory of Second-Order Arithmetic. (shrink)

Defining a class of sets to be uniform Δ02 if it is derived from a binary {0,1}{0,1}-valued function f≤TKf≤TK, we show that, for any C⊆DeC⊆De induced by such a class, there exists a high Δ02 degree c which is incomparable with every degree b ϵ Ce \ {0e, 0'e}. We show how this result can be applied to quite general subclasses of the Ershov Hierarchy and we also prove, as a direct corollary, that every nonzero low degree caps with both (...) a high and a nonzero low Δ02 degree. (shrink)

We discuss a notion of forcing that characterizes enumeration 1-genericity, and we investigate the immunity, lowness, and quasiminimality properties of enumeration 1-generic sets and their degrees. We construct an enumeration operator Δ such that, for any A, the set ΔA is enumeration 1-generic and has the same jump complexity as A. We deduce from this and other recent results from the literature that not only does every degree a bound an enumeration 1-generic degree b such that a'=b', but also that, (...) if a is nonzero, then we can find such b satisfying 0eshrink)

The psychiatrist, Dr. Charles B. Nemeroff of Emory University, is the most prominent example to date in a series of disclosures that is shaking the world of academic medicine and seems likely to force broad changes in the relationships between doctors and drug makers.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 561-562 [Access article in PDF] Gianni Paganini, Miguel Benítez, and James Dybikowski, editors. Scepticisme, Clandestinité et Libre Pensée. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002. Pp. 382. Cloth, €60.00. This book consists of papers from two Tables rondes held in Dublin in 1999 on the occasion of the Tenth International Congress on the Enlightenment. The contributors are: Paganini, Benítez, Dybikowski, Alan Charles Kors, (...) Winfried Schröder, José R. Maia Neto, Adam Sutcliffe, Justin Champion, Antony McKenna, Lorenzo Bianchi, Christine Berkvens-Stevelinck, Pierre Lurbe, Stephen David Snobelen, Nigel Aston, and Stuart Brown. There is remarkably little overlap among the papers and Paganini has clearly insisted on very [End Page 561] high standards. Because of space limitations, I shall focus on several of the general themes which run through the book rather than on individual contributions.Despite the phenomenal success Richard Popkin and collaborators like the late Charles B. Schmitt, Giorgio Tonelli, and Ezequiel de Olaso have had in documenting the amazing impact of skepticism in the Renaissance and in the years up to the Enlightenment, this volume demonstrates that skepticism, that many-faceted force, continued throughout the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. After Bayle, and the application of his special forms of skepticism to theological topics—forms which were often employed, contrary to Bayle's probable intentions, in defense of atheism—skepticism went "underground." A large variety of literature was circulated in manuscript form, the clandestine literature of the period. The lesson which this conference celebrates is that skepticism did not cease being a major cultural force. Thus there is, thanks to the philosophical dimension of the clandestine literature in the eighteenth century, a transition from Christian rationalism to an anti-Christian rationalism.Major figures of the Enlightenment were, of course, well-acquainted with skepticism, e.g., Berkeley, Voltaire, Hume, Crousaz, Condillac, Reid, and Kant. Not surprisingly, the major topics discussed in these papers center around skepticism, fideism and atheism, proofs for the existence of God, and the status of the "preambles" to the faith. These all receive careful attention. The tension between the arguments for Christian Pyrrhonism versus anti-Christian rationalism runs through many of these papers. And of course Bayle's points of view on both sides of the Christian debate appear in much of the clandestine literature. The matter of the immortality of the soul is carefully discussed. What is the status of this doctrine? Is it a question of Church dogma or is it another belief to be discarded in the light of reason?The connection perceived to hold between atheism and political legitimacy are explored in several papers. In the seventeenth century, Locke would exclude atheists from the body politic, in part because they were unable to truthfully swear an oath. Atheists were perceived as a danger for many eighteenth-century figures and the political need to suppress atheism was widely understood and accepted by those in the various religious establishments. Bayle's two-century-old attempt to break the putative logical tie between morality and religion failed in his own day, and despite the efforts of the authors of clandestine philosophical literature, the intimate link Bayle tried to break seems to be stronger than ever in much of the world today. It is interesting that the United States is virtually the only industrial and democratic society in which atheists are virtually precluded from being political candidates in federal, and probably most local, elections. Among other things, the papers in this volume help one to understand just how difficult breaking free from theological constraints in the interest of political freedom has proved to be. Harry McFarland Bracken Arizona State University, Tempe... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Learning to BreatheFive Fragments Against RacismB. Venkat Mani (bio)For Dr. JLW, for all Black academics and students1. Air HungerI know you, Derek Chauvin. You may think that we first met on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis. I was called George Perry Floyd. For you, I was just another Black man, a potential criminal. For me, you were not a police officer, but the knee that stands for racism. You (...) kneeled on my windpipe for 9 minutes and 29 seconds. Those were neither my first nor my last memories.You may choose not to recognize me, as you always have. But I do. I recognize every bone, muscle, tendon, pointy curve of the cap, every contour of your strong, heavy, determined, calculating, conniving knee that presses on my windpipe with a false sense of racist superiority. 9 minutes and 29 seconds. As often as you can.We have a history. You have never missed the opportunity of kneeling on my windpipe. You hauled me into your slave ships from various African ports along the Atlantic, then you kneeled on my windpipe all over your cotton and tobacco plantations in the Americas. We met again on schooners from Indian shores journeying across the Indian and Pacific oceans. With slavery banned in the British empire, you turned me into an indentured laborer. You made me put my thumb imprint on a document you created, in a script I could not read, of a language I could not speak. Then you threw me thousands of miles away in Mauritius, Fiji, and numerous Caribbean islands, pressing on my windpipe on sugarcane plantations. My wife, children, sisters, mothers, aunts, brothers, uncles, nephews, nieces, grandparents, great grandparents, we all have lived through those fatal 9 minutes and 29 seconds: on water and land. Repeatedly. Consistently. Incessantly.You want specific dates? April 8, 1857, Barrackpore, Northern India. My name was Mangal Pandey, you called me a Sepoy. You hanged me for standing up against my subjugation by your British East India Company. Against your rule over my land and my people. With your many titles [End Page 41] and names: Major-General Sir Henry Havelock, Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell, Brigadier-General Charles Windham, you rampaged through the streets of Delhi, Meerut, Lucknow, killing anyone in your way so I could be a jewel in Victoria's crown. January 29, 1863, Bear River, Idaho. I was one among the Shoshone of Bia Ogoi, you were Colonel Patrick Connor. You came to us on a frigid morning and killed us by the hundreds. November 15, 1884, the Congo Conference, Berlin. You were called Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and were acting at the behest of sharecropping interests of King Leopold the Second. Your name for me was a "savage." You set up a society to civilize me while you plundered my bounty. You started drawing lines through land, rivers, mountains, deserts. For you, it was the Scramble for Africa. For me, bloody murder. You knelt on my windpipe, smoking a pipe with tobacco my people had grown. April 13, 1919, Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar. You were called Brigadier General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer. For you, I was just a troublemaking native disrupting the civilized business of the Empire. You surrounded our peaceful gathering in Amritsar and opened fire. Your Nobel Laureate Rudyard Kipling claimed that "you did your duty as you saw fit." By killing us in thousands until the bullets ran out. Rikki Tikki Tavi. May 31, 1921, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Inspired by Jim Crow, your knees came running to us in mobs to massacre us. October 19, 1926, Imperial Conference, London. Your name was Field Marshall the Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts. For you, I was one among the many "colored" subjects from the Cape Colony. You spoke vehemently against mixing my people with your people. Eloquently, I was told, in favor of apartheid.You know very well, Chauvin, that our acquaintance neither begins in 1857 nor ends in 1926. I could take you on a grand tour of the world and give you all the dates when you appeared in different forms. Your self-induced conviction of racial supremacy over me remained the same... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Is Oedipus Smart?Charles B. DanielsWhat does it amount to, to ask whether Oedipus is smart, intelligent, clever? I take this to mean that he is quicker than most to gain understanding about difficult matters. Now, does Sophocles in Oedipus Rex portray Oedipus to be an intelligent, clever man?The Yes AnswerA "yes" answer to the title question may rest upon three grounds:Y1. Everyone in the play, including Oedipus himself (...) and the citizens of Thebes who have been his subjects for some 15 to 20 years, everyone, that is, save Teiresias, thinks that Oedipus is intelligent.Y2. In both legend and Sophocles' play, the only person smart enough to solve the Sphinx's riddle is Oedipus. Everyone in the play, as well as in the play's audiences, knows that Oedipus has solved the Sphinx's riddle. This is a major reason why everyone in the play, again excepting Teiresias, believes Oedipus to have a first-class mind. Oedipus is renown for this deed and thought by his subjects to be very clever in doing of it.Y3. John P. Carroll, in his interesting study of the extraordinary number of questions posed by Oedipus in Oedipus Rex (one in each nine lines of text uttered by him), concludes, "King Oedipus was endowed at birth with the heritage of the 'riddler's mind,' which by constant use throughout the course of his life he sharpened and brought to greater [End Page 562] perfection than it ever had had in his parents." 1 Oedipus is clever because he has a "riddler's mind": he asks lots of questions.Y1, Y2, and Y3, I believe, constitute the sole evidential textual base for the "yes" response to the title question. 2The No AnswerThe "no" answer, the view that Oedipus is not clever, rests upon four grounds:N1. The first consists of events from Oedipus' past that took place prior to the opening scene of the play and hence do not occur on stage. These are disclosed as the play progresses and its characters relate in dialogue what they believe to have taken place. We discover that Oedipus has lived his entire adult life with unresolved doubts about who his parents are. Worse yet, at the very beginning of his adult life, his inquiry at the Delphic Oracle met with terrible, enigmatic pronouncements that raised the ante on these doubts and made the tenor of his whole subsequent life up to the present worrisome to say the least. We learn of six questions of high moment to Oedipus—questions that touch him as profoundly as did the Sphinx's riddle, "What walks on two, three, and four legs?"—questions which he continues to be aware of and yet has not resolved, or in some cases even probed. A truly clever person, one with a "riddler's mind," would have done so. But the mature Oedipus we meet at the beginning of the play has yet to puzzle out correct answers to the questions:1. Where did the scars on my feet come from?2. Who are my real parents, Polybus and Merope, or some other couple?3. How can I best avoid doing the terrible things the Oracle foretells I shall do—killing my father and marrying my mother—given I am not sure who my father and mother really are?4. Is this old man who has just forced me off the road and arrogantly swatted me from his passing carriage my father?5. Who killed the king whose throne I have just been given?6. Is this widow I am about to marry my mother?The Oedipus we see at the beginning of the play is a man who has solved the riddle of the Sphinx, but has not solved a single one of these six questions from his own past life, which, it turns out, are easily of comparable importance to him. [End Page 563]N2. Another source of evidence in support of a "no" answer consists of failures on Oedipus' part to evince a quick wit concerning two puzzles that arise in the dramatic present among the events we see unfold on stage:7. The riddles... (shrink)

Temporal necessity and the subjunctive conditional appear to be related by the principle of Past Predominance, according to which past similarities and differences take priority over future similarities and differences in determining the comparative similarity of alternative possible histories with respect to the present moment. R. H. Thomason and Anil Gupta have formalized Past Predominance in a semantics that combines selection functions with branching time; in this paper I show that Past Predominance can be formalized and axiomatized using ordinary possible (...) worlds semantics (without branching time). (shrink)

Introduction: the ways and means of cultural change -- Science, industry and the invention of a new worldview -- Management as cultural authority -- The cultural values of work and leisure -- The strategy & spirit of capitalism -- From material need to consumer culture -- Higher learning as marketplace -- Globalization of the tightening systems knot -- Time to think -- Balancing values through cultural change -- Progress and myth -- Knowledge devalued: summary & conclusions.

Despite the results of David Lewis, Peter Gärdenfors, and others, showing that imaging and classical conditionalization coincide only in the most trivial probabilistic models of belief revision, it turns out that imaging on a proposition A can always be described via Popper function conditionalization on a proposition that entails A. This result generalizes to any method of belief revision meeting certain minimal requirements. The proof is illustrated by an application of imaging in the context of the Monty Hall Problem.

Three views on definite descriptions are summarized and discussed, including that of P. F. Strawson in which reference failure results in lack of truth value. When reference failure is allowed, a problem arises concerning Universal Instantiation. Van Fraassen solves the problem by the use of supervaluations, preserving as well such theorems as a=a, and Fa or ~Fa, even when the term a fails to refer. In the present paper a form of relevant, quasi-analytic implication is set out which allows reference (...) failure to infect even a=a and Fa or ~Fa with lack of truth-value. Reference failure causes lack of truth-value in a subwff to spread throughout any wff built up by the classical connectives. As a result none of the classical first-order axiom schemes remain as axiom schemes in the system presented. (shrink)

This perceptive study of John Case, teacher of philosophy at Oxford from the mid-1560s until his death in 1600 and author of expositions of Aristotle which became standard textbooks of the time, focuses on his intellectual and cultural milieu and reveals.

I give a probabilistic semantics for modal logic in which modal operators function as quantifiers over Popper functions in probabilistic model sets, thereby generalizing Kripke's semantics for modal logic.

The origins of this book go back to I956 when it was suggested to me that a study on the philosophy of Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola would furnish an important addition to our knowledge of the philoso phy of the Italian Renaissance. It was not, however, until I960 that I could devote a significant portion of my time to a realization of this goal. My work was essentially completed in 1963, at which time it was presented in its original form (...) as a doctoral dissertation in the Phi losophy Department of Columbia University. Since then I have made many minor improvements and several chapters have been extensively reworked. This study represents the first attempt in fifty years to give a detailed account of even a portion of Gianfrancesco Pico's life and thought. The most comprehensive previous study, Gertrude Bramlette Richards, "Gianfrancesco Pico della lv1irandola" (Cornell University Dissertation, I 9 I 5), which I have found very useful in preparing my own book, is largely based on secondary literature and is mistaken in a number of details. Furthermore, Miss Richards' treatment of Gian francesco Pico as a thinker is very sketchy and is not an exhaustive study of his own writings. It is hoped that my present study, built in part on her extensive bibliographical indications, brings forth a certain amount of new information which will be of value for further research. (shrink)

In [2] a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories — sets of sentences assembled under various constraints. Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories. A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s. A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world, whenever A is true, B is true. In this article the first-order language of [2] is extended by the addition (...) of the operator the story... says that..., as in The story Flashman among the Redskins says that Flashman met Sitting Bull. The resulting language is shown to be sound and complete. (shrink)

Can Christians affirm their belief uneqivocally without denying the beliefs of others? They can, this book holds, by claiming that Christian revelation is both reasonable and faithful to tradition, but not necessarily infallible or exclusively definitive. To the Christian, in Dr. Ketcham's words: "It is in the life, death, and Resurrection of Christ that God presently reveals Himself; this is what is meant by the term Christ-event.... The Church is therefore the community of those whose identity has been and is (...) being influenced by their encounter with God in this event." Thus the Christian "must participate in the suffering and conflict of this world, not out of superiority of insight but because of an integrity of dedication." Dr. Ketcham believes that current changes in the thinking and expression of the 19th and early 20th centuries are not matters of style or vogue. Rather, they are changes having to do with our understanding of the very nature of reality. No aspect or expression of life is left unaffected—least of all our understanding of the person and work of Jesus the Christ. Therefore "the purpose of this book is to provide an alternative to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation, an alternative which will do justice to the witness of Scripture, to the history of faith, and to the insights of a phenomenological ontology. "Beginning with the ontology implicit in Buber's _I and Thou_ and Heidegger's _Being and Time_ and responsive to the insights of Husserl's phenomenology and Kierkagaard's existentialism, Dr. Ketcham takes a more radical position than most contemporary theologians. His purpose is to make a contribution toward the revitalization and unification of the Church: "The mission of the Church is to achieve community, a oneness through the Christ-event, so that every man may affirm with freedom his authentic being with God and with his fellow man.". (shrink)

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is creating quite a stir. Suddenly gone is the famous loosey-goosey rule of Conley v. Gibson that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.Now a complaint must provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible (...) on its face. Only decided last May, Bell Atlantic has been cited in over 3,700 cases. Already being described as a landmark decision, Bell Atlantic nonetheless has lawyers and judges scratching their heads over the precise pleading standard to apply in its wake. As the Second Circuit (mildly) put it, Considerable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Just what is a plausible showing that the pleader is entitled to relief under Rule 8(a)(2)?I believe an answer lies in the 26-year-old decision of the Former Fifth Circuit in In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation. Plywood Antitrust requires, at a minimum, that a complaint . . . contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Already used in more than half the circuits, this standard paraphrases advice found in the venerable WRIGHT & MILLER for nearly 40 years.Properly applied, this all . . . material elements standard satisfies Bell Atlantic's plausibility requirement in all respects. The Plywood Antitrust pleading standard works well after Bell Atlantic, first, because the Supreme Court referred to the standard, albeit parenthetically, with approval in Bell Atlantic. Second, it does much to harmonize the Federal Rules' goal of dispensing with pleading technicalities while still requiring enough general factual information about a pleader's claim to make the notice in notice pleading meaningful. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it gives lawyers, litigants, and courts a standard they can actually use when drafting, or assessing the sufficiency of, pleadings. (shrink)

An exploration of the importance of the arts to business in this time of structural transformation. The work argues that businesses will only be successful if people are in them for the love of the game, as they are in the arts. Handy is the author of The Age of Unreason and The Empty Raincoat.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Giulio Castellani (1528-1586): A Sixteenth-Century Opponent of Scepticism CHARLES B. SCH1VHTT THE PROBLEMOF THE ORIGINS of scepticism in early modern philosophy has been a much debated issue. Sanches, Montaigne, Charron, and Bayle all contributed to the milieu which made it possible for the sceptical direction of thought to develop into such a potent force by the time of David Hume. The actual origins of modern scepticism, which seem (...) to go back to a slightly earlier date, lie in the confluence of several different intellectual movements during the early years of the sixteenth century: Christian anti-intellectualism, the reintroduction of the literary remains of the ancient sceptical tradition, the epistemological developments of scholastic nominalism, and certain inherent tendencies of Renaissance humanism. It is in the early decades of the sixteenth century that the seeds which later blossomed forth at the time of Hume originally took root. Hume himself merely reaped the harvest of several hundred years of sceptical preparation? Aside from certain manifestations of doubt which developed out of the epistemological theories of fourteenth-century nominalism, the origins of modern scepticism are generally held to date from the first publication of Sextus Empiricus' ancient summaries of Pyrrhonism during the decade of the 1560's. While it has previously been recognized that at least hints of scepticism were current in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the implications to be derived from this fact do not seem to have been adequately exploredT I shall not here go into these early manifestations of scepticism in a detailed way. Rather, I shall briefly touch upon a few little-known examples of the influence of ancient scepticism during the Reniassance and, then, I shall focus upon an early and practically neglected attack upon scepticism published before the first printings of Sextus Empiricus' writings. I shall discuss the circumstances of the composition of Giulio Castellani's anti-sceptical work, Adversus Marci TuIlii Ciceronis academicas questiones disi For a recent survey of early modem scepticism see Richard H. Popkin, The History o] Scepticism /tom Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: 1960). Of the large literature which connects scepticism with religious doubt during this period see especially Henri Busson, Les sources et le dgveloppement du rati~nalizme dar~ la litt~rature ]ran~aise de la Renaissance (Paris: 1957) and Don Cameron Allen, Doubt's Boundless Sea (Baltimore: 1964). The di.~cussionof this period seems to be the weakest part of Popkin's excellent book, particularly with regard to the treatment which he gives to Italian thought. See, also, his other articles, especially,"Skepticismand the Counter-Reformation in France," Archiv/fir Re/armationsgeschichte, LI (1960),58-86and "The High Road to Pyrrhonism," American Philosophical Quarterly, II (1965),18--32.In my forthcoming study, Gian]rancesco Pico (1469-1533) and His Critique o/Aristotle, I give a detailed analysis of the major representative of early sixteenthcentury scepticism. [151 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY putatio (1558), which antedates the first printing of Sextus Empiricus by four years, indicating that scepticism was already widespread enough to provoke an attack from the camp of the dogmatists. Furthermore, I shall analyze Castellani 's arguments in the context of the philosophical views of the mid-sixteenth century. Scepticism in the Early Renaissance Direct knowledge of the major ancient source of scepticism, the already mentioned writings of Sextus Empiricus, was rare throughout the Middle Ages. There are but two known extant Latin manuscripts which date before 1400. s From the fifteenth century we know of two more manuscripts, neither complete in itself, but together containing a significant portion of the extant writings of Sextus. 4 This evidence indicates that Sextus' works were not well known in translation before the first Latin editions of The Oulines o] Pyrrhonism (1562) and of Against the Mathematicians (1569). With the advent of an increased interest in and knowledge of Greek in Western Europe in the fifteenth century, we find a corresponding increase in the number of Greek manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Consequently, by the time of the first printings, an appreciable number of copies of his writings were available. Some were brought from the East, but a large number also are attributable to European scribes. 5 We also know that in... (shrink)

In a 1994 ANALYSIS article Peter Klein and Ted Warfield show that an epistemically more coherent set of beliefs often has a smaller unconditional probability of joint truth than some of its less coherent subsets. They conclude that epistemic justification, as understood in one version of a coherence theory of justification, is not truth conducive. After getting clear about what truth conduciveness requires, I show that their argument does not tell against BonJour's coherence theory.

"....an admirably clear account of Heidegger's relation to the philosophical tradition, and especially of his criticism of Cartesianism." -- Richard Rorty, University of Virginia.

This paper examines the characteristics of infectious diseases that raise special medical and social ethical issues, and explores ways of integrating both current bioethical and classical public health ethics concerns. Many of the ethical issues raised by infectious diseases are related to these diseases’ powerful ability to engender fear in individuals and panic in populations. We address the association of some infectious diseases with high morbidity and mortality rates, the sense that infectious diseases are caused by invasion or attack on (...) humans by foreign micro‐organisms, the acute onset and rapid course of many infectious diseases, and, in particular, the communicability of infectious diseases. The individual fear and community panic associated with infectious diseases often leads to rapid, emotionally driven decision making about public health policies needed to protect the community that may be in conflict with current bioethical principles regarding the care of individual patients. The discussion includes recent examples where dialogue between public health practitioners and medical‐ethicists has helped resolve ethical issues that require us to consider the infected patient as both a victim with individual needs and rights and as a potential vector of disease that is of concern to the community. (shrink)

By the standards presented in the Introduction, CMFC2 is deficient on at least one ontological ground: ‘∀’ is a syncategorematic expression and so CMFC2 is not an ideal language. To some there may be an additional difficulty: any two wffs provably equivalent in the classical sense are provably identical. We hope in sequel to present systems free of these difficulties, free either of one or the other, or perhaps both.This work was done with the aid of Canada Council Grant S74-0551-S1.

Since testing for HIV infection became possible in 1985, testing of pregnant women has been conducted primarily on a voluntary, ‘opt-in’ basis. Faden, Geller and Powers, Bayer, Wilfert, and McKenna, among others, have suggested that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy to reduce maternal-fetal transmission, testing should become either routine with ‘opt-out’ provisions or mandatory. We ask, in the light of the new rapid tests for HIV, such as OraQuick, and the development of antiretroviral treatment (...) that can reduce maternal-fetal transmission rates to <2%, whether that time is now. Illustrating our argument with cases from the United States (US), Kenya, Peru, and an undocumented Mexican worker in the US, we show that when testing is accompanied by assured multi-drug therapy for the mother, the argument for opt-out or mandatory testing for HIV in pregnancy is strong, but that it is problematic where testing is accompanied by adverse events such as spousal abuse or by inadequate intrapartum or follow-up treatment. The difference is not a ‘double standard’, but reflects the presence of conflicts between the health interests of the mother and the fetus – conflicts that would be abrogated by the assurance of adequate, continuing multi-drug therapy. In light of these conflicts, where they still occur, careful processes of informed consent are appropriate, rather than opt-out or mandatory testing. (shrink)

This third collection of Charles Schmitt's articles complements the previous two and consists largely of studies published in the last few years of his life. It therefore contains his mature reflections on central issues in the fields of Renaissance philosophy and science, as well as important new research findings. The main subjects are Aristotelianism and Scepticism, and the history of medicine and natural philosophy. Some articles assess the place of traditional elements in the work of major scientific innovators, such (...) as Galileo or Harvey, others make available new sources of documentation and show the significance of writings others had not deigned to look at. Charles Schmitt's insistence that Renaissance thought should be reconstructed in terms faithful to the value systems of the period also led to an increasing interest in the socio-economic context of philosophical speculation, reflected here in the studies on the University of Pisa in the 16th century. (shrink)

This essay presents a hypothesis which contends that the development of organismic complexity in the eukaryotes depended extensively on propagation via flagellated and ciliated gametes. Organisms utilizing flagellate and ciliate gametes to propagate their germ line have contributed most of the organismic complexity found in the higher animals. The genes of the flagellum and the flagellar assembly system (intraflagellar transport) have played a disproportionately important role in the construction of complex tissues and organs. The hypothesis also proposes that competition between (...) large numbers of haploid flagellated male gametes rigorously conserved the functionality of a key set of flagellar genes for more than 700 million years. This in turn has insured that a large set (>600) of highly functional cytoskeletal and signal pathway genes is always present in the lineage of organisms with flagellated or ciliated gametes to act as a dependable resource, or “toolkit,” for organ elaboration. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/lC5nC-WOcm8. (shrink)

I compare the failure of counterfactual dependence as a criterion of event causation to the failure of stochastic dependence as a criterion of causal law. Counterexamples to the stochastic analysis arise from cases of Simpson's Paradox, and Nancy Cartwright has suggested a way of transforming the stochastic analysis into something that avoids these counterexample. There is an analogical relationship between cases of Simpson's Paradox and cases of causal overdetermination. I exploit this analogical relationship to motivate my own view about the (...) connection between counterfactuals and event causation. According to my view, counterfactuals and event causation are intimately connected by a principle which falls short of being an analysis but which, as I show, correctly handles not only overdetermination but common causes as well. (shrink)